Let`s take the example of the phrase “This room is a pigsty.” The statement is simply the words that are used: Suppose it is an oral statement in English that a parent makes to a child on a specific occasion. The same parent could pronounce similar worlds in English (or any other language) that have the same semantic content. “The family room is a pigsty” – would express the same propositional content as “This room is a pigsty” if “this room” was “the family room”. The illocutionary power of this statement is ambiguous. If the child you are talking to was responsible for the mess, parents and children might understand that “this room is a pigsty” is equivalent to “cleaning this room.” The same illocutionary force can be achieved through a variety of expressions. Finally, the perlocutionary effect of “This room is a pigsty” also depends on the context. The effect could be to create shame, but it could also create anger. Thus, an utterance has both the locutionary content, the illocutionary power and the perlocutionary effect. “Constable`s agonizing attention to detail should be emphasized here, as evidenced by his precise dissection of the examples in question and the four appendices that conclude the book. Constable`s monograph is (in the author`s view) a solid continuation of the legal science and methodological development observed in his previous monograph. This transactional view of speech acts has significant applications in many areas where (human) individuals had different roles – for example, a patient and a doctor may meet at a meeting where the patient makes a request for treatment.
The physician responds with a counter-offer that includes treatment that he deems appropriate, and the patient can respond, etc. Such a conversation for action may describe a situation where an external observer (e.g., a computer or health information system) may be able to track the ILLOCUTIONARY STATE (or act of speech) of negotiations between the patient and the physicians involved, even in the absence of an adequate model of the disease or proposed treatments. The most important conclusion of Winograd and Flores is that the state transition diagram representing the SOCIAL (illocutionary) negotiation of the two parties involved is usually much, much simpler than any model representing the world in which these parties make claims; In short, the system that tracks the status of “conversation to action” does not have to model all the realities of the outside world. A discussion crucially depends on certain stereotypical claims about the status of the world made by both sides. Thus, a “conversation for action” can be easily tracked and facilitated by a device that has little or no ability to model real-world circumstances other than the ability to record claims from specific agents through a domain. However, the meaning of the linguistic means used (if there are linguistic means, since at least some so-called “speech acts” can be performed non-verbally) may also differ from the content to be communicated. In appropriate circumstances, you can ask Peter to do the dishes by simply saying, “Peter..!” or you can promise to wash the dishes by saying, “Me!” KQML and FIPA are based on Searlian, i.e. the psychological semantics of speech acts. Munindar P.
Singh has long advocated moving from psychological semantics to social semantics of speech acts, which would be consistent with Austin`s concept.  Andrew Jones was also a critic of psychological conception. A recent collection of manifestos from researchers in the field of agent communication reflects a growing recognition of the benefits of social semantics in the multi-agent systems community.  Are there other types of expressions similar to applications? Once we start searching, we will discover a lot and a lot. Orders, questions, offers, acceptances, warnings, invitations, greetings, greetings, thanks – all these types of expressions do not seem to refer to each other or have truth values. What do these expressions mean if they do not refer to them? When I give a command, I perform an action – the act of ordering X to do Y. When I make an offer, I am performing an action – creating a legally effective option for the recipient to enter into a legally binding contract by accepting the offer. When I send an invitation to a party, I perform an action – the act of inviting person P to event E.
The theory of speech act begins with the idea that language can be used to perform actions. An alternative to Austin`s explanation of the illocutionary act is that of John R. Searle. According to Searle, an “act of speech” often refers to exactly the same thing as the term illocutionary act. Searle`s work on speech acts aims to further refine Austin`s concept. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the two concepts: while Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.).  In political science, the Copenhagen School adopts the act of speech as a form of happy speech act (or simply “facilitation of conditions”) in which the speaker, often politician or player, acts in accordance with the truth, but in preparation for the audience to act in the direction of the player, pushed or stimulated by the action. This forms an observable framework under a particular theme of the player, and the audience that is “under-theorized would remain outside the frame itself and benefit from being both included and removed.”  Indeed, the public would not be informed of the player`s intentions, except to focus on the presentation of the act of speech itself. Therefore, from the player`s point of view, the truth of the subject is irrelevant, except for the result produced by the audience.  An interesting type of act of illocutionary speech is that performed in the utterance of what Austin calls performatives, typical examples of which are “I appoint John as president,” “I sentence you to ten years in prison,” or “I promise to pay you back.” In these typical and more explicit cases of performative sentences, the action described in the sentence (naming, condemning, promising) is achieved by the utterance of the sentence itself.